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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OJt'mXBSEI 
RONALD BRADSHAW, 
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vs. 
WALTER W. KERSHAW and 
H E L E N G. KERSHAW, his wife, 
WILLARD B. ROGERS, EDWARD 
B. ROGERS, and ROCKEFELLER 
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
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RONALD BRADSHAW AND TO BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENTS, WALTER W. KERSHAW 
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GUSTIN & GUSTIN 
Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Walter W. Kershaw 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, WATKISS, 
CAMPBELL & COWLEY 
Ei Paso Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
MARK S. MINER 
320 South 3rd East, Suite 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants, 
Willard B. Rogers, Edward B. 
Rogers, and Rockefeller Land 
& Livestock Co. 
F I L 
NOV] Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
480 
Form FHA 440-34 
(Rev. 12-20-68) 
\ Position 5 ) 
511 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION 
OPTION TO PURCHASE REAL P R O P E R T Y 
£*Wbff No. Z L l £ , 
Case No. £L1JL 
,
 T . , ,. c ,, „ mm „f * 100.00 i n hand paid and other valuable considerations, the receipt an< 
the owner thereof, hereby, for himself and his heirs, executors, administrators, successors and asslgns, offers and agree 
to sell and convey to 
W i l t o n A . Chr i s tensen Meadow. Utah 
(Name and Address) 
(hereinafter called the "Buyer"), and hereby grants to the said Buyer the exclusive and irrevocable option and right I 
purchase, under the conditions hereinafter provided, the followinR-described property, located in 1 SE 
County, State of — Utah 
1 - 1 . - I 1 A. - ^ „ « « . «f th» nr^nerrv including anv water rights and water stock being purchase 
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The title to said property is to be conveyed free and clear of all encumbrances except for the following reservations, 
exceptions and leases, and no others: 
(Insert here a full statement of all reservations, exceptions and leases, including in the case of leases, the date of the 
termination of the lease, the correct name(s) and address(es) of the lessee(s) and, if recorded, the place of recordation) 
None % - . 
2. JThis option is given to enable the Buyer to obtain a loan insured or made by the United States of America, acting 
through the Farmers Home Administration, United States Department of Agriculture, and its duly authorized representatives, 
(hereinafter called the "Government"), for the purchase of said property. It is agreed that the Buyer's efforts to obtain a 
loan constitute a part of the consideration for this option. 
3. The total purchase price for said property is $ ^ * * ; said amount includes 








- ^l«omnr^ inrludine. if required, abstract or certificate of title or policy 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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8. This option may be exercised by the Buyer, at any time while the offer herein shall remain in force, by mailing, 
telegraphing or delivering in person a written notice of acceptance of the offer herein to i t e r . • 
at R p M r i R n r n , in the city of S a l t l a k e C i t y 
County„f S a l t Lake
 Stateo{
 u t a h
 ; 
The offer herein shall remain irrevocable for a period of F" o u r 
— months from the date hereof and shall remai 
in force thereafter until one (1) year from the date hereof unless earlier terminated by the Seller. The Seller may termina 
this offer at any time after the F o u r months' irrevocable period provided herein by giving to the Buyer t€ 
(10) days* written notice of intention to terminate at the address of the Buyer. Acceptance of this option by the Buy 
within ten (10) days after such notice is received by him shall constitute a valid acceptance of the option. 
9. Loss or damage to the property by fire or from an act of* God shall be at the risk of the Seller until the deed to t! 
Buyer has been recorded, and in the event that such loss or damage occurs, the Buyer may, without liability, refuse to acce 
conveyance of title, or he may elect to accept conveyance of title, in which case there shall be an equitable adjustment 
the purchase price. 
10. The Seller agrees that, irrespective of any other provision in this option, the Buyer, or his assignees, may, if t 
option is accepted, without any liability therefor refuse to accept conveyance of the property described herein if the for< 
said loan cannot be made or insured because of defects in the title to other land now owned by, or being purchased 1 
the buyer. 
•11. Insert here conditions peculiar to this particular transaction. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(For use if Seller is a corporation) 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Seller has caused its corporate name to be hereunto subscribed by its 
President, and its duly attested corporate seal to be hereunto affixed by its 
, , State of . 







(Name of Corporation) 
A C K O W L E D G M E N T 
President. 
GPO B11-286 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P a r C e l # 2 C o n s i s t i n g of : E£ of SiE£ o 
A£ea 80 A c r e s more or l e s s . C o n t r a c t 
W. Stapfes of Kanosh , U t a h , and W a l t e r 
B a l a n c e $ 2 8 5 0 . 0 0 
' S e c . 10 , T 23 S R 6UI SLB&ffl. . 
i a l a g r e e m e n t b b t w e e n G r a c e 
W. K e r s h a w , S a l t Lake C i t y , Uts 
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5. The Seller also agrees to secure for the Buyer, from the records of the County Agricultural Stabilization and Conser-
vation Committee, aerial surveys of the property when available, all obtainable information relating to allotments and pro-
duction history and any other information needed in connection with the consideration of the proposed purchase of the property. 
6. The Seller further agrees to convey said property to the Buyer by general warranty deed (except where the law provides 
otherwise for conveyances by trustees, officers of courts, etc.) in the form, manner and at the time required by the Govern-
ment, conveying to the Buyer a valid, unencumbered, indefeasible fee-simple title to said property meeting all requirements 
of the Government; that the purchase price shall be paid at the time of recording such deed; and that said lands, including 
improvements, shall be delivered in the same condition as they now are, customary use and wear excepted. 
7. Taxes, water assessments and other general and special assessments of whatsoever nature for the year in which the 
closing of the transaction takes place shall be prorated as of the date of the closing of the transaction, it being expressly 
agreed that for the purpose of such proration the tax year shall be deemed to be the calendar year. If the closing of the 
transaction shall occur before the tax rate is fixed, the apportionment of taxes shall be on the basis of the tax rate for the 
next preceding year applied to the latest assessed valuation. 
(Insert here any different tax agreement) 
181 . ( Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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- * " 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Seller and the Buyer have set their hands and seals this " day of 





K^VtV.. .- , * 
(Seller) (Husband) * 
^*~ ASeller) (Wife) * 
</^^'f / - r ^ ; 'V r z~ 
(Buyer) (Husband) 
(Buyer) (Wife, 
* (Indicate marital status of Seller as "married/* "single," "divorced/' after signature.) 
(over) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEXED )^AMT-.....J/. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD BRADSHAW, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
WALTER W. KERSHAW and 
H E L E N G. KERSHAW, his wife, 
WILLARD B. ROGERS, EDWARD 
B. ROGERS, and ROCKEFELLER 
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
REPLY TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
RONALD BRADSHAW AND REPLY TO 
BRIEFS OF RESPONDENTS WALTER W. 
KERSHAW AND H E L E N G. KERSHAW 
1. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT (POINT 
1) THAT THE OPTION AGREEMENT WAS 
VALID AND ENFORCEABLE IS ERRON-
EOUS, AS CHRISTENSEN'S AGENCY WAS 
LIMITED TO OBTAINING A FARM LOAN 
. Case No. 
/ 13502 
1 
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A N D B R A D S H A W TOOK W I T H KNOWL- i 
E D G E O F S U C H L I M I T A T I O N . ] 
Respondent Bradshaw fails to answer Rogers' con-
tentions that Christensen's agency to use the option was I 
limited to obtaining a Federal Farm Loan and as 1 
Bradshaw took it (the option) with full knowledge of j 
such limitation the option consequently was invalid as 
to Rogers. Bradshaw does not dispute—indeed he does 
not mention—that the option was executed and limited j 
for the single purpose of obtaining a Federal Farm 
Loan. He could not dispute, of course, for the option ] 
so provides on its face: 
2. This option is given to enable the Buyer to ob- j 
tain a loan insured or made by the United States j 
of America, acting through the Farmers Home 
Administration, United States Department of 
Agriculture, and its duly authorized represent-
atives, (hereinafter called the "Government"), 
for the purchase of said property. I t is agreed 
that the Buyer's efforts to obtain a loan consti- j 
tute a part of the consideration for this option. j 
(Paragraph 2, Exhibit P-4) 
For the convenience of the court and counsel, a copy 
of the option is attached to this brief. 
The extensive relationship of trust, confidence and 
agency between Christensen and Kershaw emphasizes | 
why he limited Christensen's agency on the option. 
Christensen's and Kershaw's relationship of trust con-
tinued up until the confrontation between Kershaw and 
Christensen November, 1970 (herein mentioned), as j 
shown throughout the uncontradicted testimony. At 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the time of the option transaction, Kershaw describes 
his relationship as that of a "compatriot" (Tr. 534). 
Christensen undertook to build a "big cattle operation" 
for Kershaw (Tr. 33). Christensen took possession of 
the property "on behalf of Kershaw and worked them 
until late 1970" (Tr. 49:151. See also page 6, Rogers' 
Opening Brief, showing the extensive agency relation-
ship between Rogers and Christensen). 
Nor does Christensen (or Bradshaw) anywhere in 
their testimony deny that Christensen was Kershaw's 
agent in procuring the loan and that at the time the 
option was signed Christensen was operating the 560 
acres of property as Kershaw's agent. That Christen-
sen had defaulted in his payments to Kershaw whom 
he listed as a creditor in his bankruptcy papers in the 
amount of some $150,000 (Tr. 196:20-25). Christen-
sen had filed bankruptcy in May, 1970, which was 
prior to the purported exercise of the option. 
Essentially, the option was a mere form of agency. 
As stated in 2A C.J.S. "Agency", Sec. 11, p. 569: 
Where intent to create an agency appears, the 
contract will be so construed although it pur-
ports to be an option, as where the option is a 
mere form of agency given to secure to the agent 
control of the negotiations, or to lend him the ap-
pearance and character of the purchaser for the 
effect it may have on others, and it is not in-
tended that he shall acquire title or become a 
purchaser. (Our emphasis) 
The only authority under the option was to obtain a 
farm loan so that Christensen might so order his affairs 
3 
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that he could take over all Kershaw's holdings in Mil-
lard County. This required a very substantial loan, not 
just $10,050, and the benefit of the loan was to go to 
Kershaw by Christensen taking over all of these prop-
erties and their associated debts. Christensen did not 
obtain the loan from F H A (and never obtained it from 
anyone else.) The consideration for the option totally 
failed. When Christensen was not able to take over 
any of Kershaw's properties he conspired with Brad-
shaw to transfer the option to Bradshaw, gambling that 
Bradshaw could make it stick. 
Christensen and Bradshaw's utilization of the op-
tion was a calculated gamble. Christensen testified 
Bradshaw was to pay $5,000 for the 560 acres and that 
$500 was paid. (Tr. 194:16-22). He further testified: 
A. Yes, Mr. Bradshaw is to pay me the balance 
on it. 
Q. Does it have anything to do with the outcome 
to this lawsuit? 
A. I t would have, yes. 
Q. And, in other words, if Mr. Bradshaw doesn't 
prevail in this case you don't get the balance 
of that consideration? 
(Tr. 229: 2-8. See Assignment, Exhibit 5) 
Thus, Bradshaw's purported purchase of the option 
(and Christensen's tender to Kershaw) was similar to 
the tender of performance in Fischer v. Johnson (Su-
4 
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preme Court of Utah, Case No. 13530, August 6, 1974) 
which tender the court ruled insufficient for the reason: 
However, it is conceded that the plaintiffs were 
not then prepared to tender, and that they did 
not tender the $3,000 payment prerequisite to 
entering into the contract of sale. Neither did 
they indicate that they had available the $75,000 
which was to be paid upon the execution of the 
contract. 
In November of 1970 Christensen was not able to come 
up with the money to reinstate the debts upon which 
he had defaulted. This situation had not changed two 
weeks later at the time he purported to exercise the 
option. He had no money to tender to Kershaw. 
Bradshaw connived with Christensen and Kesler in 
the face of knowledge that Kershaw had, on December 
17, 1970, conveyed the 560 acres to Rogers by deeds 
and assignments (Exhibits D-7, D-9). Bradshaw took 
the assignment from Christensen January 7, 1971 (Tr. 
143; Exhibits P-5, P-4). 
Further Bradshaw took assignment of the option 
from Christensen with full knowledge that Kershaw de-
nounced the option. Kershaw had a confrontation with 
Christensen in Kesler's and Bradshaw's presence. Con-
sequently, there was more than knowledge of the limit-
ation of the option by Bradshaw. 
Christensen and Bradshaw (and apparently Kes-
ler) were wheeling and dealing to obtain the 560 acres 
from under Kershaw knowing that Kershaw had de-
nounced the option. 
5 
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Bradshaw testified that at a meeting in Kesler's 
apartment in Provo, in early November, 1970, Ker-
shaw claimed ownership of the 560 acres and proposed 
selling the property to Bradshaw. But Bradshaw coun-
tered with the argument that Christensen's option 
looked like a good option and he would check it out 
(See Bradshaw's testimony re meeting between Kesler, 
Kershaw and Bradshaw in Kesler's apartment in Provo 
early November, 1970) [Tr. 362]. 
Another meeting followed between Christensen, 
Kesler ,Bradshaw and Kershaw later in November 1970 
at the Rodeway Inn in Provo where again confronta-
tion was had between Christensen and Kershaw over 
the validity of the option and who had the right to sell 
the property and receive the money for the sale. Brad-
shaw testified: 
". . . that Mr. Christensen said that he still had 
the option and he should be the one to receive it 
and Mr. Kershaw said he was. And finally they 
argued with it and Mr. Kershaw said, " I have 
got to go to Salt Lake, get out of the car, you 
fellows." [Tr. 368] 
Rogers (unlike Bradshaw) spurned the spurious 
option that Christensen was peddling although he could 
have picked it up for $2,500. [Tr. 282:22-27] 
In the light of these unchallenged facts, respond-
ent's purported "Statements of Fact" are significant by 
reason of its omissions. On page 6 of Respondent's 
brief, where he purports to summarize the salient pro-
6 
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visions of the option, he fails utterly to mention that 
the option was only: 
to enable the Buyer to obtain a loan through the 
Farmers' Home Administration. 
And on page 10 of his brief, where he purports to 
summarize his own testimony, he fails to mention the 
confrontation between Christensen and Kershaw on the 
validity of the option at Kesler's apartment in Provo 
and at the Rodeway Inn in Salt Lake. 
The law is clear. I t is always competent for a 
principal (Kershaw) to limit the authority of his agent 
(Christensen). And where such limitation is brought 
to the attention of the party with whom the agent is 
dealing (Bradshaw) such third party is bound by the 
limitations. 
As stated in Dohrmann Hotel Supply Co. v Beau 
Brummel Inc. 99 U. 188, 103 Pac. 2d 650 (1940): 
One dealing with a supposed agent is under the 
duty to ascertain just what his capacity is. 
In the instant case, as above mentioned, Bradshaw 
admitted that Kershaw disputed Christensen's authority 
under the option. Thus Bradshaw had actual knowl-
edge of the limitations of the option. 
Brutinel v. Nygren, 17 Ariz 491, 154 Pac 1042 
(1916) is illustrative: Agent Dunn was specially auth-
orized to find a purchaser for a drugstore for his 
principal upon terms and conditions satisfactory to the 
7 
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principal. In an action for services by Nygren, (who 
negotiated the sale for Dunn), the trial court ruled 
for Nygren ,holding the agent had authority to bind 
his principal to the third party. In reversing the lower 
court's decision, the appellate court stated: 
The mere fact that one is dealing with an agent, 
whether the agency be general or special, should 
be a danger signal, and, like a railroad crossing, 
suggests the duty to "stop, look, and listen," and 
if he would bind the principal is bound to ascer-
tain, not only the fact of agency, but the nature 
and extent of the authority, and in case either is 
controverted, the burden of proof is upon him 
to establish it. In fine, he must exercise due care 
and caution in the premises. 
Brutinel was cited and followed in Phoenix Western 
Holding Corp. v. Gleeson 18 Ariz. App. 60, 500 Pac 
2d 320 (1972). 
The rule that a third party with knowledge of an 
agent's limitation cannot hold the principal in univers-
ally accepted. 
Section 166 Restatement of the Law of Agency 
states: 
Persons Having Notice of Limitations of 
Agent's Authority 
A person with notice of a limitation of an agent's 
authority cannot subject the principal to liability 
upon a transaction with the agent if he should 
know that the agent is acting improperly. 
In comment "b." under this section it is stated: 
8 
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b. As stated in Section 39, it is inferred that an 
agent has authority to act only for the principal's 
benefit. If, therefore the third person has reason 
to believe that the agent is acting for his own 
benefit, he cannot subject the principal to liabil-
ity upon a contract which in fact is unauthorized. 
In 3 Am Jur 2d, "Agency" Sec. 77, p. 481, the prin-
ciple is stated as follows: 
I t is always competent for a principal to limit the 
authority of his agent, and if such limitations 
have been brought to the attention of the party 
with whom the agent is dealing, the power to 
bind the principal is defined thereby. 
The purchaser of real estate must be particularly 
wary of the agent's authority. As stated in 2A C.J.S. 
"Agency" Sec. 223, p. 922: 
However, an authorization to sell land must be 
clear and distinct and of such a character that a 
reasonable person may unhesitatingly see that 
the principal intended to bestow it. (Our em-
phasis) 
Here, the limitation of the option to obtaining a 
farm loan was hardly a "clear and distinct authoriza-
tion" to Christensen to otherwise use the option. And 
(as pointed out above) Kershaw flatly told Bradshaw 
(November, 1970) before Bradshaw bought the option 
(January 7, 1971) that he did not intend the option 
other than for a farm loan. 
Further, Kershaw's conveyances of the property 
were recorded December 22, 1970 — Before Bradshaw 
9 
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purchased the option from Christensen (January 7, 
1971) Even before the recording of the purported op-
tion from Kershaw to Christensen (December 23, 
1970). Under Utah Code 57-1-6 this sufficed to give 
Bradshaw notice of Kershaw's denouncement of the 
option. 
We respectfully submit that as Bradshaw had 
knowledge of Christensen's limited authority, he was 
bound by such limitation and the option he purchased 
from Christensen was utterly worthless as against 
Rogers. 
2. R E S P O N D E N T S A R G U M E N T ( P O I N T 
I I , H I S B R I E F ) T H A T R E S P O N D E N T P R O P -
E R L Y E X E R C I S E D T H E OPTION, IS F U -
T I L E I N A S M U C H AS C H R I S T E N S E N ' S 
A U T H O R I T Y A N D A G E N C Y U N D E R T H E 
O P T I O N W A S L I M I T E D A N D B R A D S H A W 
W A S B O U N D BY T H E L I M I T A T I O N . 
As pointed out above, Christensen was Kershaw's 
agent and fiduciary under the option which was limited 
for the single and sole purpose of obtaining a farm 
loan on the property involved and Bradshaw was aware 
of the limitation. He and Christensen gambled on 
being able to avoid it. But, as pointed out above, under 
the law Bradshaw was bound by the limitation. Thus, 
Christensen and Bradshaw's going through the motions 
of exercising the option were idle acts that could not 
breathe life into a spent option. 
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3. R E S P O N D E N T ' S A R G U M E N T (UN-
D E R P O I N T V O F H I S B R I E F ) T H A T , AS 
T H E D A T E OF K E R S H A W ' S O P T I O N TO 
C H R I S T E N S E N (AUGUST 8, 1970) W A S 
P R I O R TO K E R S H A W ' S CONVEYANCES TO 
R O G E R S ( D E C E M B E R 17, 1970) A N D T H A T 
R O G E R S H A D K N O W L E D G E O F T H E OP-
TION, IS I D L E I N A S M U C H AS T H E O P T I O N 
W A S W I T H O U T V A L I D I T Y O T H E R T H A N 
TO OBTAIN A F A R M LOAN A N D ROGERS 
COULD O N L Y H A V E H A D N O T I C E OF AN 
I N V A L I D OPTION. 
Even if it be conceded, for the point of argument 
(but which Rogers does not concede—see opening brief) 
that Kershaw's option was dated in point of time, prior 
to the conveyance from Kershaw to Rockefeller and 
that Rockefeller had notice of the option, this would 
not avail respondent. For, as stated above, the option 
was strictly limited to obtaining a farm loan, as was 
well-known to Bradshaw. Therefore, Rogers' knowl-
edge of an invalid option (which he spurned to buy) 
would hardly overcome the limitations of the option 
which were binding on respondent Bradshaw. 
4. R E S P O N D E N T ' S A R G U M E N T ( P O I N T 
VI OF R E S P O N D E N T ' S B R I E F ) T H A T 
C H R I S T E N S E N D I D NOT V I O L A T E A N Y 
D U T Y TO K E R S H A W IS NOT T R U E , AS 
C H R I S T E N S E N , I N D E F I A N C E O F T H E 
P U R P O S E A N D L I M I T A T I O N S O F T H E OP-
TION, SOLD I T TO B R A D S H A W . 
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We submit that what we have said in points 1-3 
above, disposes of respondent Bradshaw's contention 
(Point V I ) . Christensen, in defiance of the specific 
terms of the option, the specific purpose of the option 
(to obtain a farm loan) peddled the option to Brad-
shaw (January 7, 1971) after Kershaw had conveyed 
the property to Rockefeller (December 22, 1970). 
To say the least, this was a most flagrant violation 
by Christensen of his authority to use the option. (Of 
course, however this may be, Bradshaw's purchase, nev-
ertheless, would fall as he took with knowledge of the 
limitations of the option.) 
Consequently without laboring this point, we but 
mention the general rules governing the duties of an 
agent. 
In 3 CJ.S. "Agency" Sec. 271, p. 31) it is stated: 
I t is the duty of an agent, in all transactions 
concerning or affecting the subject matter of the 
agency, to act with the utmost good faith and 
loyalty to further the principal's interests. 
And in 3 Am Jur 2d "Agency", Sec. 199, pp. 580-581: 
199. Agent as a fiduciary; duties of good 
faith, loyalty, and honesty. 
An agent is a fiduciary with respect to the mat-
ters within the scope of his agency. The very re-
lation implies that the principal has reposed some 
trust or confidence in the agent, and the agent 
or employee is bound to the exercise of the ut-
most good faith, loyalty, and honsty toward his 
principal or employer. The fiduciary relation-
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ship existing between an agent and his principal 
has been compared to that which arises upon the 
creation of a trust, and the rule requiring an 
agent to act with the utmost good faith and loy-
alty toward his principal or employer applies re-
gardless of whether the agency is one coupled 
with an interest, or the compensation given the 
agent is small or nominal, or that it is a gratu-
itous agency. (Our emphasis). 
Christensen's responsibility not to " S E L L KER-
S H A W O U T " and not to attempt to sell the property 
to Bradshaw in antagonism of Kershaw's interest in the 
property is succinctly stated in 3 Am. Jur. 2d AG-
E N C Y Sec. 220 as follows: 
An agent is duty bound not to act adversely to 
the interest of his employer by serving or ac-
quiring any private interest of his own in antag-
onism or opposition thereto, and this is a rule not 
only of law but of common sense and honesty as 
well. In all cases the principal is entitled to the 
best effort and unbiased judgment of his agent, 
and an agent is not permitted to assume two dis-
tinct and opposite characters in the same trans-
action—acting for himself and pretending to act 
for his principal. Indeed, it has been stated that 
in the usual case, it is the duty of the agent to 
further his principal's interests even at the ex-
pense of his own in matters connected with the 
agency. 
In light of the facts and the law, we respectfully 
submit that respondent's argument VI must be viewed 
as frivolous. 
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5. R E S P O N D E N T K E R S H A W ' S CONTEN-
T I O N ( P O I N T 3) T H A T T H E R O G E R S H A V E 
NO CLAIM F O R D A M A G E S A G A I N S T KER-
S H A W A N D R E S P O N D E N T B R A D S H A W ' S 
SAME C O N T E N T I O N ( P O I N T VI I ) I S NOT 
T R U E , AS T H E U N C O N T R A D I C T E D E V I -
D E N C E S H O W S D A M A G E S TO R O G E R S . 
Appellant's cross claim is against Walter W. Ker-
shaw and Helen G. Kershaw, his wife. I t states a 
cause of action for breach of warranty in the event the 
court should find that appellant was not entitled to the 
property involved in this action. 
The elements then of this cause of action are as 
follows: 
(1.) A warranty. 
(2.) A breach thereof. 
(3.) Damages. 
Walter and Helen Kershaw warranted good title 
to appellant in this language found in Ex. D-7: 
The Assignor warrants that he has succeeded to 
all of the rights, claims and interests of the other 
Buyers named in said Escrow Agreement and 
now stands in the position of being the sole Buyer 
therein and in and to the properties covered 
thereby, and that he is the sole and only owner 
of said Escrow Agreement insofar as the rights 
of the Buyers therein are concerned and has full 
power, right and authority to make, execute and 
deliver the instant Assignment. 
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The Assignor herein covenants and agrees to 
make, execute and deliver to the Assignee any 
and all deeds, bills of sale, transfers, further 
assignments and waivers, and any and all other 
muniments of title proper and necessary in the 
premises to accomplish the result that the As-
signee will become vested with the sole, separate 
and complete ownership of said Escrow Agree-
ment and all of the rights of the Buyers therein, 
thereto and thereunder and in and to the prop-
erties covered thereby, and directs and authorizes 
the Sellers in said Escrow Agreement and the 
Escrow Depositary named therein to recognize 
the Assignee herein as the owner and holder of 
the rights and interests of the Buyers named in 
said Escrow Agreement, as the successor in in-
terest to the rights, titles and interests of the 
Buyers in, to and under said Escrow Agreement 
and in and to the properties covered thereby. 
The lower court's ruling against Rogers established 
breach of warranty. Also Wilber Ha rd ing testified that 
the 560 acres involved in this action was worth $65.00 
per acre. This was uncontradicted. Bradshaw testified 
that the water right was worth $6,000.00 and this was 
not contradicted. The fact that the conveyances covered 
other property as well is of no consequence as it is only 
necessary to apply the foregoing value figures to the 
property actually involved in this cross claim. 
Respondents, Bradshaw and Kershaw, assert in 
their briefs that there was no evidence of amounts to 
which Kershaw was entitled as an offset to damages 
sustained by appellant, Rockefeller, by reason of in-
debtedness against the properties covered by the war-
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ranties. This is not the case. Respondents' witnesses 
testified that approximately $7,200 was owing to Kesler 
on the 480 acres and approximately $2,850 was owing 
on the 80 acre tract (Tr. 147, 152, 521). Furthermore, 
the proof of offset is the duty of the party claiming the 
benefit thereof. 
6. R E S P O N D E N T K E R S H A W ' S CONTEN-
T I O N ( U N D E R P O I N T I I O F H I S B R I E F ) 
T H A T R O G E R S J O I N E D I N T H E MOTION 
TO D I S M I S S K E R S H A W IS NOT CORRECT 
A N D T H E A R G U M E N T IS OUT O F CON-
T E X T W I T H T H E A C T U A L P R O C E E D I N G S . 
We call attention to the transcript, page 492, where 
defendants Rogers argued that plaintiffs failed in their 
proof that said option was a valid option. Kershaw 
failed to point out that Rogers further argued that if 
the Court found that there was evidence of a valid op-
tion, then Rogers was entitled to have this evidence sub-
mitted to the jury. 
The Court's attention is further called to the fact 
that Helen Kershaw was the proper party in the suit 
to quiet title, having signed the deed and warranty in 
the assignment and, therefore, was a proper party in 
the suit to quiet title and as such with regard to the 
issues in that case, there is no question that the issues 
as set forth in plaintiff's brief should have been sub-
mitted to the jury. 
We call the Court's attention to the recent case of 
Corbett v. Cox, 30 Utah 2d, 361, 517 Pac 2d, 318, 
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1974, wherein this Court specifically held that matters 
involving agency and issues of fact concerning the 
validity of the option (i.e.) date, consideration, prop-
erty, acceptance, and/or revocation—such issues and 
the truth thereof are customarily and traditionally sub-
mitted to the "panel of their peers" 
See also 78-21-1, U.C.A., 1953, Rule 38(a). 
The ultimate facts were violently disputed and in-
volved far more than a mere reading of the option. 
The jury heard these facts; they should have been 
allowed to decide them. 
CONCLUSION 
I t is respectfully submitted in conclusion that the 
judgment of the lower court in depriving these appel-
lants of rights in and to the subject property consti-
tutes a grave miscarriage of justice. The lower court 
even failed to recognize that at the least whatever in-
terest Kershaw had in the property was transferred to 
Rockefeller and has failed to recognize that any money 
passing from Bradshaw to Kershaw should in the light 
of such transfer be paid to Rockefeller and not Ker-
shaw. Assignments with warranties and quit claim 
deeds have meaning. Of course, ordering this money 
paid to these appellants will not correct this miscarriage 
of justice. 
The miscarriage of justice can only be avoided in 
this case by the court's reversing the lower court and 
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ordering that judgment be entered in the lower court 
quiting title in favor of Rockefeller to the 560 acres 
of land and well permit. We feel the uncontradicted 
evidence which we have mentioned in our brief and 
which is revealed by the testimony and other evidence 
in this case should compel such a holding. If the court 
should feel that this cannot be, then we respectfully 
submit that this cause should be reversed for a new 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W I L L I A M H . H E N D E R S O N 
MARK S. M I N E R 
R O B E R T C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants, 
Rockefeller Land and Livestock Co., 
Willard B, Rogers and Edward B. 
Rogers. 
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